



# Packaging in Microsoft Intune

*Fully Third-Party · Managed · DevOps — Security · Control · Speed · Effort.  
Pick three.*



**onedeploy**  
Windows Deployment Reimagined



**Insight**

**control up**



**robopack**

**numecent**

 **Microsoft**

**eido**

**Rimo3**

# Raise your hands



WHO PACKAGES  
APPLICATIONS?




WHO MAINTAINS THEM?



WHO GETS CALLED WHEN  
SOMETHING BREAKS?

# Packaging is a Process, not a file



# Why this topic, why now



Increased  
automation



Larger attack  
surface



Higher  
compliance  
pressure

# Niels Kok

---

- Sysadmin/Consultant -> DevOps Engineer
- Microsoft MVP – Intune + Azure Virtual Desktop
- Freelance





**BRAINPULSE IT**  
CONSULTANCY & TRAINING

# Stefan Dingemanse

Microsoft Cloud Consultant & Architect



Microsoft MVP · AVD / Windows 365 · MCT



Dordrecht, Netherlands · Brainpulse IT



Co-Founder AVD Community & Dutch VDI User Group



Hybrid Athlete - Running & Weightlifting



# What we'll cover

- 01 The real problems behind "packaging"
- 02 How we got here
- 03 Common solutions
- 04 Trade-offs, not opinions
- 05 The North Star — and the four pillars
- 06 Your trade-off: which pillar can you defend losing?



**DEPENDENCY  
ISSUES**



**BUILD FAILURES**



**BIG FILE SIZE**

# PROBLEMS

WITH APPLICATION PACKAGING



**ENVIRONMENT ERRORS**



**SLOW PERFORMANCE**





**BROKEN  
THERE**

# Problem / issues

- Supply chain attacks (Shai-Hulud 2.0) - **Security**
- Public/Private repositories - **Security** - **Control**
- Chocolatey / Winget Deployment flow - **Control** · **Effort**
- Winget Publishing Process - **Security** · **Control**
- Custom – Windows – Legacy - **Control** · **Effort**
- Time consuming / Costs - **Effort**
- Consistency Packages (PSADT / MSIs/ etc) - **Control** · **Effort**
- Poor Reporting - **Security** · **Control**

## Attack through deployment and testing tools






# Public vs Private Repositories: Who Do You Trust With Your Binaries?

Public Repository	Private Repository
Community or vendor controlled	Organisation controlled
Fast, wide coverage	Slower onboarding
Low effort	Higher effort
Shared responsibility	Full accountability
Limited auditability	Audit-ready


Use Winget/Choco to download installer and publish to Microsoft Intune



Winget Repository



Laptop with WinTuner PSModule




**Publish script as installer in Microsoft  
Intune to download apps from  
Winget/Choco**



Winget Repository



Intune Engineers Laptop



# Update all Winget/Choco Applications



Winget Repository



Run Remediation/Win32App to run:  
*“Winget/Choco Upgrade all”*



- Files
- master
- Go to file
- .config
  - .github
  - .vscode
  - DevOpsPipelineDefinitions
  - Tools
  - doc
  - fonts
  - manifests
  - schemas
  - .editorconfig
  - .gitattributes
  - .gitignore
  - CODE\_OF\_CONDUCT.md
  - CONTRIBUTING.md**
  - LICENSE
  - README.md
  - SECURITY.md
  - SUPPORT.md

winget-pkgs / CONTRIBUTING.md

Trenly Fix Link for Authoring.md (#145849)

88c58f9 · 2 years ago History

Preview Code Blame 188 lines (116 loc) · 11.5 KB

# Windows Package Manager **Community Repository** Contributor's Guide

Below is our guidance for how to report issues, propose new features, and submit contributions via Pull Requests (PRs).

## Open Development Workflow

The Windows Package Manager team is VERY active in this GitHub Repository. In fact, we live in it all day long and carry out all our development in the open!

When the team finds issues we file them in the repository. When we propose new ideas or think-up new features, we file new feature requests. When we work on fixes or features, we create branches and work on those improvements. And when PRs are reviewed, we review in public - including all the good, the bad, and the ugly parts.

The point of doing all this work in public is to ensure that we are holding ourselves to a high degree of transparency, and so that the community sees that we apply the same processes and hold ourselves to the same quality-bar as we do to community-submitted issues and PRs. We also want to make sure that we expose our team culture and "tribal knowledge" that is inherent in any closely-knit team, which often contains considerable value to those new to the project who are trying to figure out "why the heck does this thing look/work like this???"

## Repository Bot

## Windows 10's package manager flooded with duplicate, malformed apps

By [Ax Sharma](#)

June 1, 2021 11:15 AM 4



Last week, Microsoft [released](#) the first stable version of its Windows 10 package manager, Winget, which enables users to manage apps via command-line.

Much like package managers available on other platforms, Winget lets Windows users automate app management when it comes to installing, configuring, upgrading, and uninstalling applications.

But, over the weekend, multiple users flooded Winget's software registry with pull requests for apps that are either duplicate or malformed, thereby raising concerns about the integrity of the Winget ecosystem.

## Exploits &amp; Vulnerabilities

# ZDI-23-1527 and ZDI-23-1528: The Potential Impact of Overly Permissive SAS Tokens on PC Manager Supply Chains

In ZDI-23-1527 and ZDI-23-1528 we uncover two possible scenarios where attackers could have compromised the Microsoft PC Manager supply chain.

By: Nitesh Surana

Apr 15, 2025

Read time: 12 min (3247 words)



## Authors

**Nitesh Surana**

Senior Threat Researcher

[CONTACT US](#)

## Summary:

- This blog explores two possible scenarios where PC Manager releases could have been hijacked by attackers via WinGet repository, 'aka.ms' URLs, and an official subdomain of Microsoft, due to overly permissive SAS tokens.
- If an attack had been carried out, cybercriminals could have compromised software supply chains for distribution of malware, allowed them to replace software releases, and alter distributed PC Manager executables.
- These issues detailed in this blog have been reported to Microsoft and have since been resolved. This blog details recommendations on how to avoid similar potential compromises.
- This blog entry documents the outcome of security research conducted in 2023. Microsoft has since provided additional guidance and updates to the rules of engagement of the Azure Bounty Program. This blog is for educational purposes only.



## What Is The Chocolatey Community Repository?

By Paul Broadwith | Posted Friday, March 1, 2024

### Who Creates and Maintains Packages?


You. Me. People like us. Members of the Chocolatey Community. Anybody can create and maintain a package.

A package maintainer ensures that a package is up-to-date, works as it should and commits to continue that maintenance. There is [process for packages that are out of date or no longer being maintained.](#)


# Chocolatey Package Submission




1. Push Package



2. Chocolatey  
Community Repository  
Received Package



3. Package Validator




4. Package Verifier



 VIRUSTOTAL  
5. Package Scanner



6. Human Moderator



6. Trusted Package



7. Package  
Approved and  
Available For Use

[Home](#) > [News](#) > [Security](#) > [Serpent malware campaign abuses Chocolatey Windows package manager](#)


## Serpent malware campaign abuses Chocolatey Windows package manager

By [Bill Toulas](#)


March 21, 2022

01:10 PM

3



Threat actors are abusing the popular Chocolatey Windows package manager in a new phishing campaign to install new 'Serpent' backdoor malware on systems of French government agencies and large construction firms.





**Current Version 8.9.1**

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# Notepad++ Hijacked by State-Sponsored Hackers

2026-02-02

Following the security disclosure published in the v8.8.9 announcement <https://notepad-plus-plus.org/news/v889-released/> the investigation has continued in collaboration with external experts and with the full involvement of my (now former) shared hosting provider.

According to the analysis provided by the security experts, the attack involved infrastructure-level compromise that allowed malicious actors to intercept and redirect update traffic destined for notepad-plus-plus.org. The exact technical mechanism remains under investigation, though the compromise occurred at the hosting provider level rather than through vulnerabilities in Notepad++ code itself. Traffic from certain targeted users was selectively redirected to attacker-controlled malicious update manifests.


The incident began in June 2025. Multiple independent security researchers have assessed that the threat actor is likely a Chinese state-sponsored group, which would explain the highly selective targeting observed during the campaign.


An incident-response (IR) plan was proposed by the security expert, and I facilitated direct communication between the hosting provider and the IR team. After the IR team engaged with the provider and reviewed the situation, I received the following detailed statement from the provider:

# Custom & legacy apps

## Where catalogs stop helping

- MST transforms
- Custom configs
- Line-of-business apps





# Reporting

- If answering this requires multiple tools or manual checks, you don't have control, you have hope.

Installed?	Not Installed?	Failed?
App A? ?	App ?? ?	App ?? !
Software ?	App ?? ?	Tool X ??? ?
Tool X ??? ?	App ???	Program ?
!		App ?? !



# SOLUTIONS



# The North Star of Application Packaging for Intune



*Secure & Efficient Application Delivery*

# Solution Categories

## CLASSIC APPROACH

### Manual

Download, package, upload, assign manually. Works at small scale but hits a wall fast.

## MANAGED TOOLING

### Third-Party

Vendor platforms automate packaging, scanning, and delivery. Fastest path to scale.

## DIY

### Self-Hosted DevOps

Own the full pipeline in code. Maximum control, highest upfront effort.

# Pillars

## Security

- Where binaries come from
- How they're scanned and validated
- Who owns the risk when something goes wrong

## Control

- Who decides what gets installed and when
- How updates are approved, delayed, or rolled back
- How custom logic and LOB apps are handled

## Speed

- How fast apps reach production
- How quickly updates and patches flow
- How much manual work is removed

## Effort

- Engineering time required
- Operational overhead
- Complexity of maintenance and governance

# Manual deployment

## Classic approach

- Download
- Package
- Upload
- Assign
- Fix issues manually




# Score card – Manual Deployment

Problem	How Manual helps	What remains	★
Supply chain attacks	You manually choose sources	No systematic scanning	★
Public/private repositories	Direct downloads	No central control	★
Deployment flow	Flexible & simple	Not repeatable	★★
Custom & legacy apps	Works for all apps	Very time consuming	★★★★
Time & cost	No tooling cost	High labour cost	★
Consistency	Engineer dependent	Not scalable	★
Reporting & auditability	Best effort	Incomplete	★

**Total score: 11/35**

*Manual Packaging: Solves Speed, Not Scale*

# Manual — Speed only. Everything else loses.



The shape fits one use case: the building is on fire, and you need something installed tonight.

# Do it yourself

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Fully DevOps




Defender running on this machine



Microsoft Intune

Checks for:  
Hashes  
Malicious code  
Etc.




# Score card - DevOps

Problem	How DevOps helps	What remains	★
Supply chain attacks	Mirror, scan, validate	You own the work	★★★★★
Public/private repositories	Internal artifact feed	Needs maintenance	★★★
Deployment flow	Fully controlled pipeline	Engineering effort	★★★★★
Custom & legacy apps	First-class citizens	Requires standards	★★★★★
Time & cost	Lower long-term cost	Higher upfront cost	★
Consistency	Pipeline enforced	Discipline required	★★★★★
Reporting & auditability	End-to-end audit trail	Build effort	★★★

**Total score: 26/35**

*DevOps: Solves Control, Auditability, and Ownership, but costs Effort*

# DevOps - Security, Control, Speed at scale. Pays in Effort.



Maximum Security and Control at scale. The cost lives in Effort.

# Third-Party


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Third-party tooling

# Third Party

## What these tools typically solve

- Ready-made packages at scale
- Automated updates and patching
- Standardised install logic
- Less scripting knowledge required
- Faster time to production
- Lower operational effort



# Are third-party tools the same?

**No**, key differences across vendors

## Security scanning

Depth of vulnerability scanning and source verification varies between vendors.

## Custom support

Some vendors handle custom and legacy apps; others stick to catalogs only.

## Update strategy

Patching cadence, ring rollouts, and auto-update behaviour are not standardised.

## Licensing

Per-device, per-user, or flat-fee, feature tiers and contract terms vary widely.

## Who curates source

Specialised vendor (PMPC, Action1, ManageEngine), Microsoft EAM (in Intune), or OEM/in-house catalogs (Lenovo, HP).

*Different vendors. Same trade-off: someone else controls what gets in.*


# Score card – Third-Party

Problem	How Third-Party helps	What remains	★
Supply chain attacks	Vendor scanning & curation	Vendor's upstream still hits you	★★★
Public/private repositories	Managed catalogs	Vendor dependency	★★★
Deployment flow	Standardised & automated	Third-Party model limits	★★★★
Custom & legacy apps	Supported	Still special cases	★★★★
Time & cost	Massive time savings	License cost	★★★★
Consistency	Enforced packages	—	★★★★★
Reporting & auditability	Vendor-provided reports	Limited end-to-end	★★★★

**Total score: 23/35**

*Third-Party Tools: Solves Speed and Consistency. Security depends on the vendor you trust.*


# Third-Party — Speed + Effort solved. Security moves to the vendor.



Source ownership transfers — to the vendor, or to Microsoft (EAM). Same trade-off, different vendor.


# Same score. Different trade-off.

No path fills the North Star. Choose the shortfall you can defend.




*Manual is out of the race. Third-Party and DevOps tie at 16/20 — on different pillars.*


# Three shapes. Your choice.



**Manual**  
*Emergency only*



**Third-Party**  
*Scale by default*



**DevOps**  
*Control by design*

# Takeaways



# Key Takeaways

## 01 Packaging is a supply-chain decision

If you don't control the source, you don't control the risk.

## 02 There is no "best" model

Security, Control, Speed, and Effort can't be maxed at the same time.

## 03 Third-party tools buy speed, not ownership

Reduced effort, more consistency, but responsibility stays with you.

## 04 DevOps is about control, not complexity

But you'll have to build it yourself.

## 05 Manual packaging solves urgency, not scale

It works, until it becomes your bottleneck and your risk.

## 06 Auditability is the real end goal

If you can't answer *what, where, and why*, you have hope, not control.

# What matters most

## 01 No universal best solution

Every organisation must evaluate based on scale, risk, and capabilities

## 02 Security & traceability are mandatory

Know what is installed, where it came from, and why

## 03 Own your trade-offs

Security, Control, Speed, and Effort can't all be optimised at once.

# Closing

Questions. Discussion. War stories.

