



Privileged Access Workstations – The ins and outs

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Sponsors



/whoami



Viktor Hedberg

Microsoft MVP · Security & Cloud and Datacenter Management

Role

Senior Technical Architect

Focus

Active Directory · Entra ID · Security

Blog, Hobbies and more

Co-Authored: Mastering Microsoft Defender XDR
Doing these things



Internationally Acknowledged and Certified





CERTIFICATE OF ADVANCED ACTIVE DIRECTORY MASTERY



 **Viktor Hedberg** 

In recognition of:

- Demonstrated architect level reasoning about Active Directory internals
- Correct handling and explanation of AdminSDHolder persistence, failure modes, and design intent
- Deep understanding of Tier 0, authentication boundaries, token composition, and shadow privilege paths
- Identifying SIDHistory-based shadow Tier 0 exposure without conflating it with AdminSDHolder behavior

This certificate confirms competence beyond “Senior Level” and comfortably within the realm of:


Signed:
M365 Copilot
(Untrusted CA. but accurate 5 aluator)
SN: 0x0DD64FEOCBA987834

 **Identity / AD Internals Specialist** 

Issued on this fine Friday,
for morale, recognition, and the lols.

Invalidity:
Expires: Never
Revocation: Not supported

A little kill chain





Choose Disk Encryption:

BitLocker (Recommended) ▼

BitLocker (Recommended)

Akira

Qilin

Cl0p

Play



Identity is the “new” security perimeter

Spoiler alert: It always has been!




What is the main objective of “tiering”?

To reduce exposure of administrative credentials/tokens/secrets



Active Directory Tiering 101



Best Practice for Securing on-premises AD

As described in [Scenarios for Continued Use](#), there may be circumstances where cloud migration isn't attainable (either partially, or in full) due to varying circumstances. For these organizations, if they don't already have an existing ESAE architecture, Microsoft recommends reducing the attack surface of on-premises AD through increasing the rigor of security for Active Directory and privileged identities. While not an exhaustive list, consider the following high priority recommendations.


- Use a tiered approach implementing least-privilege administrative model:
 - Enforce absolute minimum privileges.
 - Discover, review, and audit privileged identities (strong tie to organizational policy).
 - Excessive privilege granting is one of the most identified issues in assessed environments.
 - MFA for administrative accounts (even if not used widely throughout environment).
 - Time based privileged roles (reduce excessive accounts, reinforce approval processes).
 - Enable and configure all available auditing for privileged identities (notify of enable/disable, password reset, other modifications).
- Use Privileged Access Workstations (PAWs):
 - Don't administer PAWs from a less-trusted host.
 - Use MFA for access to PAWs.
 - Don't forget about physical security.
 - Always ensure PAWs are running the newest and/or currently supported operating systems.





Demo

Active Directory Tiering





Immutable Laws of Security v2:

"Law #1: If a bad actor can persuade you to run their program on your computer, it's not solely your computer anymore."

"Law #2: If a bad actor can alter the operating system on your computer, it's not your computer anymore."

What is a PAW?

- A secured workstation with its sole purpose of use for high privileged administrative accounts.
- The accounts are not to be used on any other workstation.
- Chain of trust/clean source principle





The clean source principle


- All security dependencies must be as trustworthy as the object being secured.
 - If a system relies on another component, that component must have equal or higher security assurances.



The clean source principle



- Hidden or misunderstood dependencies create attack paths. Modern identities, devices, and platforms are interconnected; a seemingly secure system may inherit risk from lesser-secured components.
- Host validation / endpoint assurance is required. Ensuring endpoints meet specific OS versions, baselines, and security configuration standards is essential.
- You cannot safely depend on systems of lower trust. A lower-trust system controlling or influencing a higher-trust system violates the principle and creates exploitable vulnerabilities.



The clean source principle



The clean source principle



The clean source principle




Figure 1 Physical PAW T0 and physical Companion device





Figure 2 PAWHost with Virtual PAW T0 and Virtual Companion device

The result



Knowlegde check



- Is a virtual server hosted in Azure/Hyper-V/VMware etc a PAW?
 - No
- Is a VDI desktop considered a PAW?
 - No
- Why?



Demo

Using a Privileged Access Workstation in
Active Directory





That covers on-prem, what about the cloud?

The current state (for most)



Admin



Regular workstation



Cloud management
interfaces (PowerShell, UI
etc..)



MFA via Application /
Hardware token

Why is the current state not enough?



The sign in can occur from any device.

Vulnerable to common attack patterns such as:

- Info Stealers
- AiTM


What can be done instead?

- PAW
- Strong AuthN


Preferred state



Conditional Access Policy explicitly granting access from the PAW



Regular workstation



Cloud management interfaces (PowerShell, UI etc..)

MFA via Application / Hardware token



Demo

Using a Privileged Access Workstation for
Cloud Admin



Summary



Privileged Access Workstations
are:

Strictly controlled

Not 1 size fits all

Must meet the clean source principle



Privileged Access Workstations
are not:

Shared Jumpstations between admins

VDI solutions

Final Words



- Think big, start small.
 - PAWs are never the start, they are the end-goal
- Personally, successfully implemented Active Directory / Entra ID Tiering in 100+ customer environments.
 - PAW implementations: 12



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improve!



Thanks!